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Abstract 
Utilizing a comprehensive dataset that includes a sample of 104 countries for corn, 54 countries 
for soybeans, 82 countries for wheat, and 77 countries for rice and covers the period from 1991 
to 2013, we estimate a globally comprehensive but heterogeneous (country-specific) 
transmission elasticities between international prices and domestic producer prices. We mainly 
utilize the traditional two-step Engel-Grange cointegration model and the recently developed 
nonlinear autoregressive distributed lags (NARD) model to estimate the transmission 
elasticities. We find mixed evidence on the existence of long-run relationship between 
international and domestic price. For corn 66 out of 104, for soybeans 27 out of 54, for wheat 
47 out of 82, and for rice 49 out of 77 countries, we fail to have a long-run relationship. For 
corn and soybeans, the long-run relationship is evident in top producing countries whereas the 
converse is evident for wheat and rice, particularly for rice. We also find that the pass-through 
of international to domestic prices is asymmetric in the majority cases—these asymmetries are 
negative, i.e., the domestic producer prices react less fully to an increase in international prices 
than to a decrease and are acute in the short-run than the long-run. We also estimate the crop-
specific short-run global mean transmission elasticities, which vary from 0.358 (corn) to 0.524 
(soybeans). 
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1 Introduction 
Estimation of how the supply of global agricultural commodity responds to international prices 
depends on the knowledge of transmission elasticities between international and domestic 
producer crop prices. This knowledge is particularly necessary to separate out genuine supply 
response from aggregate global supply response as estimated by Roberts and Schlenker (2013), 
Haile, Kalkuhl, and von Braun (2014), Hendricks, Janzen, and Smith (2015), and Haile, 
Kalkuhl, and von Braun (2015). The estimates of these authors’ supply elasticity consist of two 
parts: the degree of transmission of international prices to domestic producer prices and the 
genuine supply response to expected producer prices (Haile et al. 2015). While estimating 
supply responses to prices, these authors assume that the transmission of international price 
signals to domestic markets is the same across all countries. But, the degree of transmission 
elasticities is supposed to differ across crops, countries, and/or regions depending on the 
country-specific trade policy, economic policy, market power enjoyed by agricultural products 
processing and marketing industries, and so on. These means the existing estimates of the global 
supply elasticity cannot provide a satisfactory answer about the true supply response. Thus, the 
research concerning the extent to which international agricultural commodity price signals is 
transmitted to domestic producer prices in different countries is required.  
  There are a number of other reasons relating to supply response enlighten us on the 
importance of estimating transmission elasticities between international and domestic prices. 
First, the issue of global land use changes caused by biofuels production and other economic 
shocks. In the past couple of years or so, a significant number of studies has been conducted by 
agricultural and environmental economists with an attempt to measure the indirect land use 
change caused by biofuel production in the U.S. It is argued that biofuel diverts crops from food 
and thereby food demand and prices rise given that the amount of supply is fixed. In response 
to higher prices, it is likely that farmers across the world increase their production either by 
increasing their crop yields on existing agricultural land or by converting land from other crops 
or from forest or pasture land. Given the assumption that the increase crop yield requires the 
invention of new seeds or technology, and which requires long-term investment, so additional 
production will come through the conversion of new land, which is defined as the indirect land 
use changes caused by biofuel production. These whole process can function well  if the 
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changes in international prices are being transmitted to the producers prices of a country at a 
higher rate or perfectly.  
  A closely connected issue of this is the sustainable agricultural production. When the 
long-term transmissions of international prices to domestic markets are slow and imperfect, 
producers make decisions based on prices that do not represent their real social costs and 
benefits. As a result, there is strong empirical evidence from both  developing and developed 
countries that any large, sustained deviation of domestic price from world prices in either 
direction leads to substantially suboptimal outcomes and slows the rate of economic growth 
(World Bank, 2012). The next important issue is the international price instability. If a fall in 
international prices is not fully transmitted to domestic prices, then reduction in world supply 
and increases in world demand that would have otherwise occurred will not take place—thereby 
making the price reduction more acute and prolonged—hence, on a global scale, significant 
local market isolation triggered by government intervention may induce augmented price 
fluctuations (Quiroz and Soto, 1995; Ghoshray, 2011). For example, during 2006-2010, some 
rice-producing countries in Asia commenced protecting policies, which lead to higher volatility 
of international rice price and thereby benefited them in the short-run but perhaps these policies 
was no good neither for the world nor for these countries, which have suppressed the price 
signal necessary for their own efficient supply response (World Bank, 2012).  
  Another motivation of this paper is to examine whether agricultural trade liberalization 
that started to take place from the beginning of the 1990s has any impact on the magnitude of 
the transmission elasticities. Price transmission from world markets to domestic markets is 
affected by several factors, including transport costs, countries’ levels of self-sufficiency, 
exchange rates, and domestic shocks, but trade policy is perhaps the most fundamental 
determinant of the extent to which world price shocks pass through to domestic markets (FAO, 
2011). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, developing countries started to liberalize their 
agricultural policies so that their domestic markets become more integrated into world markets 
(see WTO), but a globally comprehensive and country-specific differentiated empirical analysis 
of price transmission that covers post-reform period are not available in the existing literature. 
Hence, this paper will add value to the existing literature by examining the transmission of price 
signals from the world market to domestic producers using post-reform period data. 
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Last but not least, the issue of asymmetric transmission—there is a widespread belief that 
the pass-through of an increase in international prices is not same as that of a decrease in prices. 
Direct price intervention by governments may result in the domestic price being completed 
unrelated to the international prices or in the two prices being related in a nonlinear manner so 
that increases in international price are transmitted to the domestic level while decreases in 
international price are transmitted in relatively slowly (Ghoshray, 2011). Using large samples 
of diverse products (77 consumer and 165 producer goods), including agricultural products, 
Peltzman (2000) finds output prices tend to respond faster to input increases than to decreases 
in more than two of every markets examined, which in fact challenge the standard economic 
theory that  does not explain the incidence of asymmetric price (Peltzman, 2000).  
 Thus, the objective this paper is to provide a worldwide but heterogeneous (country-
specific) linear and asymmetric transmission elasticities between the internaltiol and domestic 
producer prices for four key agricultural crops namely corn, soybeans, wheat, and rice2.  We 
analyze these fours crops because together these four crops make up about 75 percent of the 
caloric content of food production worldwide (Roberts and Schlenker, 2013) and about 51 
percent of the global aggregate harvested cropland3. Hence, any changes in the production or 
land use of these four crops due to changes in international prices will have a significant impact 
worldwide. We use the yearly data covering the period 1991 to 2013 and consisting of both the 
leading and small growers of these four commodities. Along with the linear transmission, our 
approach accounts for nonlinear asymmetric transmission resulting from country-specific trade 
and economic policies, production policies, transaction costs, price support, exchange rates , 
and so on. In addition to traditional Engle-Granger cointegration model, we utilize the nonlinear 
autoregressive distributive lag (NARDL) model, recently developed by Shin et al. (2014). The 
NARDL model simultaneously and coherently models both the short- and long-run 
asymmetries and the cointegration relationship in a dynamic adjustment framework. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses a theoretical background 
on price transmission and reasons for asymmetries. Section 2 presents a review of the existing 
literature. Section 3 discusses the empirical model and econometric methods we utilize to 
                                                             
2 International prices and world prices are used synonymously in this paper  
3 Author’s calculation: 2010-2013 average and includes both temporary and permanent crops 
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estimate the empirical model. Section 4 provides data description. Section 5 presents the 
empirical findings and an interpretation of the findings. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review 
Most recent studies have investigated the price transmission of consumer prices rather than 
producer prices (e. g., Minot, 2011; Baquedano and Liefert, 2014; Kalkuhl, 2014). Studies that 
have focused on the transmission of producer prices are Anderson and Tyers (1992), Mundlak 
and Larson, (1992), Quiroz and Soto (1995), Sharma (2003), and Baquedano et al. (2011), 
among many others. Earlier studies such as Mundlak and Larson (1992) examine the 
transmission of world prices and exchange rates to producer prices for 58 countries for 1968–
78 and for the countries of the European community for 1961-85. Their sample cover some 60 
products and they use a simple correlation coefficient to test for the market integration. These 
authors find a very high transmission elasticities (median was 0.95).  
 Starting from 1990, agricultural applied economist rely on advanced econometric methods 
such as cointegration and error-correction models (ECM) to examine the international price 
signals domestic markets. Anderson and Tyers (1992) utilize ECM to calculate the short and 
long-run transmission elasticities by expressing domestic producer prices for each commodity 
in each country in terms of border prices. Their analysis cover 30 countries and 7 agricultural 
commodities for the period 1961–1983 and they find on average a transmission elasticity equal 
to 0.3 for most countries. 
 Quiroz and Soto (1995) use a dynamic ECM to estimate the transmission elasticities and 
find a much lower transmission for most countries, and no transmission in the long run for 30 
out 78 countries using the updated data covering the period 1966 to 199. They argue that the 
high transmission elasticities as found by Mundlak and Larson (1992) might be due to a 
spurious regression problem as prices variables were non-stationary at the level form.  
 Using similar methods (ECM), Sharma (2003) estimates transmission elasticities for Asian 
cereal markets and the estimates indicate that the short-run transmission elasticities are typically 
in the range of 0.2 to 0.4. Baffes and Gardner (2003) examine the world price signals to 
domestic prices for eight countries and ten commodities and find that only 3 countries out of 8 
were integrated with world markets. Based on the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
Page 5 of 32 
 
models, and of the corresponding Error Correction specification, Conforti (2004) examine price 
transmission in 16 countries, including 3 in Sub-Saharan Africa, primarily for basic food 
commodities. The results indicate that the African markets included in the sample are 
characterized by an incomplete transmission compared to Latin American and Asian markets. 
 Recently, Baquedano et al. (2011) investigate the level of integration of Malian and 
Nicaraguan agriculture into world markets, and estimate transmission elasticities between 
changes in the countries’ border and domestic prices, for one export and one import commodity 
for each country, using generalized ECM. A general conclusion of their results is that 
Nicaraguan agriculture is more integrated into world markets than that of Mali. Relative to 
Nicaragua, Mali exhibits a slower convergence of producer to border price for its main export 
crop of cotton. 
 In summary, the above reviews indicate that a worldwide empirical analysis which focuses 
on the extent to which the world prices of key agricultural crops have been transmitted to 
domestic producer prices in the post-liberalization period is missing. Hence, this paper plans to 
fill that gap. Estimation of these is particularly important for supply analysis. The magnitude of 
supply responses in developing countries is shaped by transmission of world prices, not just to 
the retail level, but also at the farm level—if farm gate prices do not increase, there will be no 
supply response (FAO, 2011) and this is applicable for other countries as well.  
 
3 Theoretical Background4 
The law of one price (LOP), a fundamental part of the purchasing power parity (PPP) theory, 
is the basis of the price transmission theory. The LoP states that with complete elimination of 
all arbitrage and no transportation cost, the prices of traded homogenous goods would be the 
same in all spatially separated but competitive markets when expressed in a common currency. 
The Samuelsson single commodity model (1952) and the Takayama-Judge multicommodity 
model (1971) have similarity with the LOP, which also characterize how domestic prices are 
linked to commodity markets. The Takayama-Judge (1971) model, an extension of the 
Samuelsson single commodity model (1952), characterizes a simultaneous equilibrium in 
markets for several commodities, regions and time point. This model states that if the trade 
                                                             
4 The discussion of this section is largely based on Liefert and Persaud (2009) and Witzke et al. (2011). 
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takes place between two countries, then price differences between countries cannot exceed per 
unit transport costs and price differences between two-time points cannot exceed per unit 
storage costs. The former is called arbitrage condition and the latter is called temporal arbitrage 
condition. The three possible regimes of the arbitrage condition cit cjt cijtP P T≤ + can be written 
depending on the trade balance: 
(1a) cit cjt cjitP P T= +   ; if region i import from region j with transaction cost T 
(1b) cit cjt cijtP P T= −   ; if region i export to region j with transaction cost T 
(1c) cit cjt cijtP P T< +   ; no trade will occur 
where P is commodity prices with the subscripts c, i, and j refer to a crop, a home country, and 
a foreign country, respectively. The basic spatial arbitrage conditions stated in (1a)-1(c) are 
called the weak LoP. If these conditions hold with equality, then it is called strong LOP 
(Fackler, Goodwin, p. 978).  
For price transmission to be perfect (let’s denote transmission elasticity, 1cjtcitcj
cjt cit
PP
P P
β ∂= =
∂
, transaction costs need to be proportional to prices, i.e., cij cij ciT Pτ= . Similarly, if a country 
imposes tariff on imported good, then the transmission elasticity can be perfect assuming the 
country levies ad valorem tariffs, where the tariff is calculated as a percentage of the world 
price—then any percent change in the world price may result in an identical percent change in 
the domestic price (assuming no domestic transport or transaction costs for the imported 
product).  
It is barely true that the real world would satisfy every condition that is required for 
perfect price transmission. For example, if the tariff or transaction costs are a fixed charge per 
unit of good imported or exported, then the absolute changes in international prices would be 
fully passed on to the domestic markets , assuming that the arbitrage condition holds with 
equality and there are no other costs involved. Depending on the direction of trade flows, this 
would imply a transmission elasticity equal to greater or less than one.  
Starting from the beginning of the 1990s, agricultural applied economists (e.g., Anderson, 
1992; Larson, 1992; Quiroz and Soto, 1995) have begun to examine the price transmission of 
agricultural commodities for policy purposes and for a large set of commodities and countries, 
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which include both the exporting and importing countries. To include all the possible scenario 
(exporter or importer) that majority empirical studies cover in their analysis, we express the 
arbitrage conditions (1a)-1(c) using the following inequality (assuming no other trade costs 
other than the transaction costs) 
(2) ;cjt cijt cit cjt cijtP T P P T+ ≥ ≥ − Assuming transportation costs are symmetric, cijt cjitT T=  
where cjt cjitP T+ is the domestic price for imported good and cjt cijtP T− is the domestic price for 
exported good. Transportation costs (T) affects the degree of price transmission from world 
prices to domestic prices depending on the direction of trade. Given the fixed T, we can make 
the following two statements 
Statement 1: As cit cjtP P>  for importing countries/commodities due to the existence of T, a 
given percentage change in cjtP  will generate a smaller percentage change in citP . As a result, 
the transmission elasticity between andcit cjtP P  will be less than one, i.e.   
(2.1) Transmission elasticity (importer) 1as with 0cjtcitcj cit cjt cijt
cjt cit
PP P P T
P P
β ∂= < > >
∂
 
Statement 2: The existence of T results cit cjtP P<  for the exporting countries/commodities. As 
a result, a given percentage change in cjtP  will generates a higher percentage change in citP  and 
the transmission elasticity between andcit cjtP P  will be greater than one, i.e. 
(2.2) Transmission elasticity (exporter), 1as with 0cjtcitci cit cjt cijt
cjt cit
PP P P T
P P
β ∂= > < >
∂
 
There are other factors that may slow down or cause international prices to be transmitted 
into domestic market imperfectly or asymmetrically. Such factor includes country-specific 
trade-related policies such as tariffs and quotas, price support, deficient market infrastructure, 
asymmetric information, variable transportation costs, the market power of the middlemen, and 
so on.  
Since one of our research objectives is to estimate asymmetric transmission elasticities, 
we will discuss here how the above-mentioned factors can cause prices to asymmetrically 
transmit. Suppose, the food processors and wholesalers of countries have the market power 
over producers from which they purchase primary output, then for a given change in world 
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prices food processors and wholesalers might use their market power to reduce the degree to 
which they pass on the price increases that they receive to their farm suppliers. Similar to this, 
the market imperfection of incomplete information caused by deficient market infrastructure 
may result in slower pass-through of world prices to domestic prices when world prices 
increase.  When a country’s internal infrastructure is not good, then producers in isolated areas 
might be unaware of the world price movements. This can give wholesalers additional power 
over farms to control price transmission in favor of them. Figure 1 shows such kind of 
asymmetric transmission.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Asymmetric Changes in Domestic Prices (PD) from an equivalent change in 
international prices (PW) [Meyer and Taubadel, 2004] 
 
In summary, whether transaction are fixed or proportional to prices and/or tariffs are ad 
valorem or fixed charge per unit of goods and/or import quotas are unchanged or not and/or 
every agent of the market has the access to full information is an empirical question and hard 
to measure as details data on these for all countries around the world are rare. An alternative 
approach is to ignore all these factors and to estimate the degree of transmission between 
domestic and world prices—then make an attempt to explain heterogeneous price transmission 
elasticity using some macroeconomic variables such as trade volume, inflation, real GDP, 
exchange rate volatility, trade share in total consumption, and so on. Our focus here is to 
estimate the magnitude of transmission elasticities.  
 
 
 
t 
P 
PD 
 
PW 
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3 Empirical Model and Estimation Methods 
Empirical Model 
 Our empirical model mainly follows from the law of one price (LOP). For any particular 
commodity c, the spatial relationship between the domestic and world prices can be expressed 
as a multiplicative approximation (Richardson, 1978)5 
(3) 31 2 4* 0cit cjt cjt cjit cjitP P E T R
ββ β ββ=   
where *citP is the domestic price of commodity c in time t, cjtP  is world price of commodity c in 
time t, cijtE  is the domestic exchange rate expressed in US dollar,  cijtT is a transaction or other 
trade-related costs cijtR is residuals reasons for price differences between domestic and world 
markets and 0 1 2 3 4, , , ,andβ β β β β  are parameters. The assumption of complete commodity 
arbitrage along with the assumption of homogenous products across countries suggest that the 
strong law of one price will be satisfied if  
(4) 0 1 2 3 41, and 0β β β β β= = = = =  
The converse is true if there are no commodities arbitrage and commodities are nontraded. In 
such situation the equation (4) becomes 
(5) 1 2 3 0β β β= = =  
 In the real world, the condition (5) will not hold if a good is traded. Similarly, the 
condition (4) may not hold due to the existence of transaction costs, deficient infrastructure, 
markets powers, and differences in product quality as we have discussed in the previous section. 
By admitting the limitation that we do not have worldwide data on these indicators, we rewrite 
the equation (3) for each country and crop as follows (lowercase letters indicating logs) 
(6) 0 1cit ci ci cjt citp p uβ β= + +  
where * /cit cit cijtp P E=  denotes domestic prices expressed in US dollars, citu  is an unobserved 
disturbance term which includes both omitted variable T and R. The coefficient 1β is the 
elasticity of the domestic price with respect to the world price, to be called as the elasticity of 
transmission.  
                                                             
5 Most LOP tests and/or price transmission literature utilize a model similar to this 
Page 10 of 32 
 
Estimation Methods 
Linear Cointegration tests 
A number of time series econometric techniques such as linear cointegration, threshold 
cointegration, causality, ARDL models have been used by applied economists to test each of 
the components of price transmission. Engle and Granger (1987) or in short EG cointegration 
model is the most widely used one. This study uses the traditional two-stage EG model to 
estimate the transmission elasticities when it comes to the question of linear and symmetric 
transmission of international prices to domestic prices.  
If we find that the two price series as shown in equation (6) are integrated of the same 
order, say I(1), that is , they contain a unit root (stochastic trend), then the regression of the 
domestic on international prices may produce a spurious regression. The EG model takes care 
of that issue and provides long run equilibrium relationships between non-stationary integrated 
price variables. The EG model states the two price series will be cointegrated if the linear 
combination of them, which takes the form  0 1cit cit cjtu p pβ β= − −  , is I (0).  Once we find the 
evidence of the existence of the long-run relationship in equation (6), we estimate the traditional 
linear ECM, which takes the following form 
(7) 1 11 1 1 0
p q
cit ci ci cit ci cjt cis cit s cis cjt s cits s
p p p p p uµ ρ θ φ π− −− − − −= =∆ = + + + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑  
where the symbol ∆ denotes a first-difference of the variables, e.g., 1it it itp p p −∆ = − , p and q are 
the order of lags, itε  is an iid process. The model in equation (7) is called symmetric ECM, 
which provides both the short- and long-run transmission elasticities that are linear and 
symmetric.  
Non-Linear Cointegration test 
The model in equation (7) would be miss-specified when price transmission is nonlinear 
and/or asymmetric. To estimate the asymmetric transmission, we employ the nonlinear 
autoregressive distributive lag (NARDL) model, recently developed by Shin et al. (2014). The 
NARDL model simultaneously and coherently models both the short- and long-run 
asymmetries and the cointegration relationship in a dynamic adjustment framework. One of the 
main advantages of using the NARDL model is it detects hidden cointegration-a concept 
introduced by Granger and Yoon (2002). Hidden cointegration exists if both price series are not 
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cointegrated in the conventional sense, but their positive and negative sums are cointegrated 
with each other (Granger and Yoon, 2002). With this keep in mind, we decompose international 
prices, cjtp  into its positive and negative partial sums, i.e., cjtp
+  and cjtp
− , of increases and 
decreases such as 
(8) 1 1
1 1
max( ,0) and
min( ,0)
t t
cjt cjk cjkk k
t t
cjt cjk cjkk k
p p p
p p p
+ +
= =
− −
= =
= ∆ = ∆
= ∆ = ∆
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
  
After introducing the partial decomposition of equation (8) into the traditional ECM (equation 
7), we get a more general ECM as follows (Shin et al., 2014) 
(9) 1 1' ' ' ', 1 , 1 1 , , ,1 0 ( )
p q
cit ci ci ci t ci cj t ci cjt cis ci t s cis cj t s cis cj t s cits s
p p p p p p pµ ρ θ θ φ π π ε− −+ − + + − −− − − − − −= =∆ = + + + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑  
Or, 
(10) 1 1 ' ', 1 , ,1 0 ( )
p q
cit ci ci i t cis cit s cis cj t s cis cj t s cits s
p p p pµ ρ ξ φ π π ε− − + + − −− − − −= =∆ = + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑   
where the superscripts ‘+’ and ‘-’ denote positive and negative partial sums defined in equation 
(8), p and q denote the lag order of the variables, and ' 'cit cit ci ci cjt ci cjtp p pξ α β β
+ + − −= − − −  is the 
nonlinear error correction term where / and /ci ci ci ci ci ciβ θ ρ β θ ρ
+ + − −= − = −  are the associated 
asymmetric long-run parameters, the parameters ' 'andcis cisπ π
+ −  denote the short-run adjustments 
to the positive and negative shocks affecting the domestic producer prices.  
 Equation (10) is known as NARDL model and is linear in all parameters— so a reliable 
estimation of equation (10) can be obtained by standard ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Moreover, for the NARDL model, it is not necessary that the time-series variables should be 
integrated of the same order. The estimation of the ECM utilizing an NARDL model is likely 
to improve the performance of the model in small samples, particularly in terms of the power 
of the power of cointegration tests and it allows modeler the flexibility of testing the absence 
of linear and nonlinear cointegration among the variables as well as allows ability to 
simultaneously estimate both short- and long-run asymmetries in a computationally simple and 
tractable manner (Shin et al. 2014). 
 Once equation (10) is estimated by standard OLS, we can then judge whether 
international and domestic prices share nonlinear cointegrating relationship or international 
price changes have both the short- and long-run symmetric or asymmetric effect(s) on domestic 
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producer prices. Following Shin et al. (2014), this paper uses the t-statistic called tBDM to 
examine the existence of an asymmetric long-run relationship in equation (10)., which tests 
0ciρ =  against 0ciρ <  in equation (10). If 0ciρ = , equation (10) reduces to the regression 
involving only first differences, implying that there is no long-run relationship between the 
levels of international and domestic prices. 
 Given that we obtain the asymmetric relationship (a short-run or a long-run or both) 
between the levels of international and domestic prices, we may observe patterns of asymmetric 
dynamic adjustment of the variables from initial equilibrium to a new equilibrium. The 
asymmetric adjustment paths of the changes of domestic prices to unexpected changes in the 
international prices are captured by the positive and negative dynamic multipliers associated 
with unit changes in cjtp
+    and cjtp
−  as follows: 
(11) 
0 0
h hcit s cit s
cih cihs s
cjt cjt
p pm and m
p p
+ −+ +
+ −= =
∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂∑ ∑    with h=0, 1, 2….. 
By construction, as , ,, cih ci cih cih m and mβ β
+ + − −→ ∞ → →  where andci ciβ β
+ − are the asymmetric 
positive and negative long-run coefficients, respectively, as defined earlier. These multipliers 
are derived from the interaction of the impact (associated with ' 'cis cisπ π
+ −≠ ) and reaction 
(associated with ci ciβ β
+ −≠ ) asymmetries in conjunction with the error correction coefficient ciρ .   
 Depending on the model specification (either allowing only short-run asymmetry or long-
run asymmetry or neither), the patterns of dynamic adjustment vary. When null hypothesis of 
long-run symmetry cannot be rejected in equation (10), we obtain the following model by 
imposing the long-run symmetry restrictions ci ci ciθ θ θ
+ −= = in equation (10) 
 (12) 1 1 ' ', 1 , 1 ,1 0 ( )
p q
cit ci ci i t ci cj t is ci t s cis cjct s cis cjct s cits s
p p p p p pµ ρ θ φ π π ε− − + + − −− − − − −= =∆ = + + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑  
When null hypothesis of short-run symmetry cannot be rejected in equation (10), we obtain the 
following form of NARDL model by imposing the restriction ' 'js js jsπ π π
+ −= =   
(13) 1 1' ', 1 , 1 , 1 , ,1 0
p q
cit ci ci ci t ci ci t ci cj t cis ci t s cis cj t s cits s
p p p p p pµ ρ θ θ φ π ε− −+ − +− − − − −= =∆ = + + + + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑  
 We summarize our estimation approach as follows: 
Step 1. We use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test to examine the time-series 
properties of the price series.  
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Step 2. Following the general two-step approach of Engle and Granger (1987), we first estimate 
a static and long-run symmetric equation using ordinary least squares (OLS). From these 
estimates, we then obtain lagged residuals and use it as error correction terms in the traditional 
linear ECM and finally we estimate the ECM utilizing OLS. 
Step 3. We adopt the linear long-run asymmetric equation and apply OLS methods to estimate 
the model. From the long-run model, we obtain one year lagged residuals and then introduce 
lagged residuals as the error correction term into traditional ARDL model and estimate the 
NARDL-based error correction model (ECM) proposed by Shin et al. (2014). This model 
provides the magnitude of both the short- and long-run asymmetric pass-through of 
international prices to domestic prices. 
 
4 Data  
 In estimating equations (6), (7), and (10) we use a comprehensive database covering the 
period 1991 to 2013. We obtain annual data on international spot prices of maize, soybeans, 
wheat, and rice from the World Bank and domestic producer prices from the FAOSTAT 
database of Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). The exchange rate that is used to 
convert domestic prices into U.S. dollar is obtained from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) database. The sample countries included in our analysis differ by crops. We select all 
countries for which prices data were available and who produce one of the fours crops. For 
maize, the number of sample countries is 104 and for soybeans, it is 54. The number of sample 
countries for wheat and rice are 82 and 77, respectively. Together these countries produce more 
than 96 % of the total global production of these four crops. The number of observation for 
each country is 23 except the countries of former Soviet Union. Prices series for these countries 
are available from 1994, so for them, the number of observation reduces to 20.   
 
5 Results and Discussion 
Estimates of country-specific transmission elasticities that are derived from equations (6), (7) 
and (10) as well as the cointegration testing results for corn, soybeans, rice, and wheat are 
presented in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Table 5 reports the unit root test results for 
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international price6. We present the results for the countries, which together produce at least 90 
% of the total global crop production. The minimum production share that we use for selecting 
the countries varies by crops—from 0.1 % (soybeans) to 0.5 % (corn). Country-specific 
production share for each crop has been calculated dividing the 1991-2013 country average 
production by the global crop-specific average production during the same period.  We begin 
by testing the unit roots (non-stationary) for each country crop prices using augmented Dickey-
Fuller test. Then, for each country and crop, we apply both the linear traditional and nonlinear 
cointegration techniques to test long-run relationship as well as to estimate the transmission 
elasticities. Columns (2) and (3) of the each table report the unit root and cointegrating testing 
results, respectively. The estimated transmission elasticities obtained using equations (6) and 
(8) are reported in columns (4a) and (4b). Columns (5a)-(6b) presents asymmetric transmission 
elasticities using equation (10). Our discussions start with the crop corn.  
Corn 
The unit root test results of the column (2) in Table 1 provide strong support for the hypothesis 
that the corn price series is nonstationary for each country with the exception of Ukraine. These 
findings are consistent with the existing empirical evidence that the crop prices received by 
producers at level forms are in general nonstationary (e. g., Rapsomanikis et al. 2006; 
Baquedano et al. 2011, Haile et al, 2015). This means if we regress corn producer price on the 
corn international price, it is likely that the regression will produce spuriously significant 
transmission coefficients, suggesting the existence of relationships that do not, in fact, exist 
(Granger and Newbold, 1974). To avoid such spurious regression results, it is common practice 
in the existing empirical literature to use cointegration techniques developed by econometrician 
(e. g., Engle and Granger, 1987; Johansen, 1988). We first use the Engle-Grange (EG) linear 
cointegration test and two-stage approach to avoid the spurious problem. We then use the 
NARDL model to investigate nonlinear cointegrating relationship. 
-TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE- 
 The first issue is whether prices are connected linearly in the long run. Column (3a) 
provides results for linear cointegration tests and columns (4a) and 4(b) report the transmission 
coefficients as estimated using the linear EG ECM. Not all country regressions are found to be 
                                                             
6 All international prices contain a unit root at the level form. 
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cointegrated.  From the Table 1, we find that 15 out of the top 22 corn producing countries have 
the existence of cointegrating relationship between domestic and international corn prices and 
therefore driven by a single common trend. Most African countries and countries in Europe are 
noncointegrated and are therefore domestic producer prices essentially isolated from the long-
run international price changes. This implies that the extensive land use changes that have 
occurred in African countries in the last decade or so are either due to the changes in domestic 
land use policy or domestic price incentives or macroeconomic policy or higher food demand 
from the increasing population. A country like India, who is one of the top ten corn producing 
and exporting countries also fail to exhibit a long run relationship with international prices, 
which is an indication that corn producer in India are heavily supported by the government or 
corn wholesale markets are controlled by few firms. From the beginning 2000s, India has 
increased price support and input subsidies (see table 2.10 in OECD-FAO 2014), which may 
help for increasing crop production even though international price signals did not transmit 
properly over the last two decades.  Countries that exhibit the long-run relationship with 
international prices are dominated by the top exporter of corn and agriculturally developed 
countries like the U.S., Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, and Ukraine. 
  The second issue is the degree of symmetric transmission elasticities both in the short-and 
long-run. Of the 22 countries which exhibit a long-term relation with international prices, not 
all show a long-run transmission elasticity equal to one or closer to one. One would expect a 
long-run transmission elasticity equal to one if LOP would have held. 10 out of the 14 countries 
have transmission elasticities greater than 0.75. These countries are dominated by the countries 
in North and Latin America, Europe, and agriculturally developed countries from the Asia. 
Surprisingly, China, the second leading producer of the corn, has the long-term transmission 
elasticity equal to 0.14 only. This low value indicates that Chinese agricultural sectors are 
heavily distorted by government policy. The magnitude of short-run transmission elasticities 
varies across countries with a range of -0.002 (China) to 1.49 (U.S.). Again, high price 
transmission are from the same region as stated above and China has almost zero transmission 
elasticity in the short-run.  
 Failure to have a long-term relationship in a linear cointegrating framework in 7 out of the 
top 22 world aggregate corn producing countries give rise to our next research questions—
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whether the long-run relationship is asymmetrically connected and if so, then to what degree 
the domestic price responds with an increase or decrease of international price.  Column (3a) 
present the nonlinear cointegrating testing results and columns (5a)-6(b) report both the short- 
and long-run asymmetric transmission elasticity. Surprisingly, the number of cointegrating 
countries reduces. The cointegration tests are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no nonlinear 
cointegration in 12 out of 22 countries. Countries such as China, France, and Nigeria that were 
previously cointegrated in the linear case, are now non-cointegrated. Countries which did not 
exhibit a long run relationship in the linear cointegration test, still fail to support the evidence 
of a long run relationship.  
 The asymmetric transmission elasticities are found both in the short- and long-run. Of the 
10 countries that are cointegrated, six show negative asymmetry, i.e., long-run changes in prices 
are upward sticky and downward flexible (Columns (5a) and (5b)). Countries in these group 
are U.S., Argentina, Philippines, Ukraine, Brazil, and South Africa. One explanation for this 
finding is that the imperfect competition in processing and exporting industries allows 
middlemen to abuse market power and thereby farmers receive less of the price increase than 
they face more drop with a decrease in international price. Industry concentration and 
imperfectly competitive behavior beyond the farm-gate implies that wholesalers, or middlemen 
with power over price, may exercise pricing strategies that result in a slow and incomplete pass-
through of increases in the international price and a fast and complete transmission of decreases 
in the international price to prices upstream, as their margins are squeezed (Rapsomanikis et 
al., 2006). The asymmetries also exist in short-run and are dominated by upward stickiness 
(Columns (6a) and (6b)). The short-run transmission asymmetries are severe than the long run. 
In most countries, domestic price responds less to an increase in international price to a decrease 
and the absolute value of negative asymmetries are higher in short-run than the long-run.  
Soybeans 
As expected, the unit root test results indicate that the soybeans producer price series are 
nonstationary for all countries (column (2) in Table 2). The linear cointegration testing results 
imply that in 15 out of the 24 top soybeans producing countries have the existence of the long-
run linear relationship. Surprisingly, Brazil and Argentina who together produce about 37 
percent of the total global soybean production, are found to be cointegrated. The long-run 
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symmetric elasticities that we obtain from the model in equation 6, are very high for most of 
the countries and some are greater than one (Column 4a). In general, the short-run elasticities 
are found to be lower than the corresponding long-run one (Column 4b). This phenomenon is 
evident among the top soybeans producing countries, who are mainly developing countries.  
The nonlinear cointegration testing results indicate that 16 out of 24 countries are found to be 
nonlinearly cointegrated. Brazil that was previously nonintegrated in the linear case is now 
cointegrated. Countries that fail to have a long run relationship in the linear case, are found to 
be cointegrated (Column 3b). With regard to the asymmetric elasticities, we find the existence 
of both short- and long-run asymmetries— both short- and long-run elasticities are dominated 
by upward stickiness (Columns 5a-6b). In general, the short-run transmission asymmetries are 
more evident than the corresponding long run one. 
-TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE- 
 
Wheat and Rice  
As a part of the routine check, we again conduct the unit root tests for both wheat and rice 
producer prices and we find all prices contain unit roots at the level form (column (2) in Tables 
(3) and (4)). For wheat, both the linear and nonlinear cointegration testing results indicate that 
almost half of the top 26 wheat producing countries does not have the existence of the long-run 
relationship, which are mainly developing countries. The mean value of the symmetric short-
run elasticity is 0.69. Asymmetries are present both in the short-and long-term. The short-run 
asymmetries are more evident than the long-run with a mean value of the transmission elasticity 
equals 0.68 when price increases and -0.76 when price decreases (Table 3).  
-TABLE 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE- 
 For rice, we find that more than half of the top 21 rice producing countries are in the group 
of no long-run relationship— majority of them are from the top rice producing and developing 
countries (Table 4). The mean value of the symmetric short-run elasticity is 0.42, which is low 
compared to wheat. Asymmetries are present both in the short-and long-term. The mean long-
run transmission elasticity equals 0.63 when price increases and -0.53 when price decreases. 
The converse is evident for short-run asymmetries with a mean value of the transmission 
elasticity equals 0.30 when price rises and -0.79 when price decreases. These results indicate 
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that in the short-run farmers cannot reap up the full benefits of the international price increases, 
perhaps middlemen of the top rice producing countries have higher market power than the 
farmers and/or the farmers are not fully informed about the international markets. 
-TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE- 
  
Global Mean Estimates of the Transmission Elasticities 
 In this subsection, we make an attempt to estimate the mean short-run transmission 
elasticities for each crop and for aggregate four crops by using the following equation (dynamic 
panel model) 
(14) , 1 1 2 , 1 *cit c c ci t c cjt c cj t c c ci citp p p p t tµ ρ θ θ γ τ η ε− −= + + + + + + +  
where the price variables are the same as defined before, t denotes linear time trend, t* refers 
to time dummy, ciη is country-crop fixed effects.   
 We estimate the equation (14) in a panel setting, where the numbers of panel group are 
crop-specific total countries when we estimate mean estimates for each crop and are country-
crop pairs when we estimate mean estimates for aggregate four crops. The empirical 
methodologies that we use are two-step system and difference generalized method of moments 
(GMM). Both system and difference GMM estimators take care of the so-called dynamic panel 
bias or Nickell (1981) bias that can arise due to the correlation between lagged dependent 
variable and country fixed effect. Both estimators address endogeneity issue of the variables by 
using its own lagged values as the instruments.  
TABLE 7 AND 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Table 7 and 8 report short-run estimates of the crop-specific global mean transmission 
elasticities and global aggregate (four crops) elasticities. The results indicate that soybeans have 
the highest transmission elasticity (0.524) and maize has the lowest (0.358) [Table 7]. The 
global aggregate transmission elasticities vary from 0.322 to 0.480 depending on the number 
of instruments we use. One implication of these result is that the existing studies on global 
supply responses to prices do not reflect the true responses as all the global supply responses 
model assume homogenous and perfect price transmission.  
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 We can summarize our all findings as follows. First, we find mixed evidence on the 
existence of long-run relationship between international and domestic prices—for corn 66 out 
of 104, for soybeans 27 out of 54, for wheat 47 out of 82, and for rice 49 out of 77 countries, 
we fail to have a long-run relationship (Table 6). For corn and soybeans, the long-run 
relationship is evident in top producing countries whereas the converse is present for wheat and 
rice, particularly for rice. This is not unexpected as the top rice producing countries fall into the 
category of developing countries. Second, the asymmetric pass-through is visible for all crops 
and countries—in most cases the asymmetry is negative, i.e., the changes in domestic prices 
are upward sticky but downward flexible—prices fall more than the prices rise with equivalent 
changes international prices. The short-run asymmetries are acute than the long-run one. Third, 
the crop-specific short-run global mean transmission elasticities vary from 0.358 (corn) to 0.524 
(soybeans). 
  
Conclusion 
 By investigating the degree of price transmission from international prices of key four 
agricultural commodities to domestic producer prices, this paper makes two major contributions 
to the existing literature. First, it provides a globally comprehensive but heterogeneous 
(country-specific) transmission elasticities between international prices and domestic producer 
prices. Second, using both the traditional linear cointegration and recently developed nonlinear 
cointegration methods, it provides the magnitude of both symmetric and asymmetric short- and 
long-run pass-through of international prices to domestic prices, which can be defined as 
transmission elasticity as well.  
 Utilizing a comprehensive dataset that includes a sample of 104 countries for corn, 54 
countries for soybeans, 82 countries for wheat, and 77 countries for rice and covers the period 
from 1991 to 2013, we find mixed evidence on the existence of long-run relationship between 
international and domestic price. For corn 66 out of 104, for soybeans 27 out of 54, for wheat 
47 out of 82, and for rice 49 out of 77 countries, we fail to have a long-run relationship. For 
corn and soybeans, the long-run relationship is evident in top producing countries whereas the 
converse is present for wheat and rice, particularly for rice. This is not unexpected as the top 
rice producing countries fall into the category of developing countries. We also find that the 
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pass-through of international to domestic prices is asymmetric for all crops and countries. In 
most cases the asymmetries are negative, i.e., the domestic prices react less fully to an increase 
in international prices than to a decrease. The short-run asymmetries are acute than the long-
run one. This is bad for the farmers as they gain less with an increase in international prices 
than they lose with a decrease. Last but not least, our results also indicate that the crop-specific 
short-run global mean transmission elasticities vary from 0.358 (corn) to 0.524 (soybeans). 
 We expect our empirical estimates of transmission elasticity will be valuable inputs for 
measuring the actual global agricultural supply response caused by recent higher world 
commodity prices. We also hope our analysis and findings will complement and provide further 
insights on the discussion of “the degree of pass-through of international prices to domestic 
producer prices” in the agricultural commodity prices transmission literature.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Cointegration Testing Results and Estimated Transmission Elasticities of Corn for 
Countries who produce at least 0.5 % of the total global corn production 
country Production 
Share 
Unit Root 
Test 
Cointegration Tests Symmetric Elasticities 
from EG model 
Asymmetric Elasticities from NARDL model 
 (1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b) 
  t-ADF 
Stat.* 
Traditional: 
t-EG value* 
Asymmetric: 
t-BDM value* 
Long 
-run 
Short 
-run 
Long 
-run (+) 
Long 
-run (-) 
Short 
-run (+) 
Short 
-run (-) 
USA 0.389 -1.66 -4.82 -5.14 0.99 1.49 1.03 -1.07 1.62 -1.63  
China 0.200 -2.05 -3.61 -3.10 0.14 0.00 0.43 0.18 0.34 0.25 
Brazil 0.062 -1.14 -4.43 -3.86 0.84 0.85 0.78 -0.84 0.99 -0.57 
Mexico 0.029 -1.38 -2.22 -0.13 0.72 0.60 -4.35 8.67 0.81 0.03 
Argentina 0.024 -1.15 -3.97 -3.23 0.87 0.78 0.87 -1.05 0.69 -0.93 
France 0.023 -1.27 -4.20 -2.52 0.90 0.86 0.80 -0.96 0.57 -1.17 
India 0.021 -1.55 -2.91 -1.45 0.36 0.21 0.00 0.56 0.34 0.20 
Indonesia 0.017 -1.52 -5.06 -4.01 0.87 0.82 0.92 -0.86 0.95 -0.70 
SA 0.014 -1.75 -4.67 -4.12 0.71 0.80 0.68 -0.78 0.77 -0.84 
Italy 0.014 -0.66 -3.19 -2.48 0.96 0.88 0.78 -1.02 0.66 -1.03 
Romania 0.014 -2.22 -4.35 -3.57 0.60 0.92 0.55 -0.04 1.09 -0.54 
Canada 0.013 -1.49 -4.16 -3.89 0.78 0.71 0.80 -0.73 0.87 -0.50 
Ukraine 0.011 -4.93 -7.01 -6.82 0.99 1.33 0.82 -0.86 1.06 -1.38 
Hungary 0.010 -1.54 -3.78 -3.29 0.79 1.10 0.80 -0.60 0.92 -1.28 
Nigeria 0.009 -2.88 -3.43 -2.99 0.53 0.68 0.32 -0.98 1.40 0.54 
Egypt 0.009 -1.87 -3.04 -2.50 0.42 0.33 0.43 -0.05 0.55 -0.01 
Philip. 0.008 -1.23 -5.84 -4.97 0.84 0.70 0.85 -1.14 0.76 -0.75 
Thailand 0.006 -1.17 -5.95 -4.26 0.81 0.86 0.87 -0.86 0.98 -0.91 
Spain 0.006 -1.41 -2.58 -1.43 0.81 0.69 0.42 -0.28 0.50 -0.74 
Germany 0.005 -1.00 -3.04 -2.69 0.96 1.06 0.79 -1.00 0.79 -1.32 
Ethiopia 0.005 -2.27 -2.91 -2.20 0.70 0.24 1.01 -1.03 -0.06 -0.70 
Tanzania 0.005 -1.39 -5.41 -5.20 0.65 0.28 0.92 -1.29 0.31 -0.66 
Notes: * Critical values for t-ADF, t-EG, t-BDM are 3.24, 3.24, and 3.21, respectively at the 10 % level of 
significance ; White (no shaded)  indicates countries that are cointegrated in both linear and nonlinear tests , dark 
white (shaded) indicates countries that are noncointegrated in both linear and nonlinear tests, and blue (shaded) 
denotes countries who are cointegrated in either tests. 
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Table 2. Cointegration Testing Results and Estimated Transmission Elasticities of Soybeans for 
Countries who produce at least 0.1 % of the total global soybeans production 
country Production 
Share 
Unit Root 
Test 
(Producer 
Prices) 
Cointegration  
Tests 
Symmetric Elasticities 
from EG model 
Asymmetric Elasticities  
from NARDL model 
 (1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b) 
  t-ADF 
Stat.* 
Traditional: 
t-EG  
value* 
Asymmetric: 
t-BDM  
value* 
Long-run Short-run Long-run  
(+) 
Long-run 
 (-) 
Short-run 
 (+) 
Short-run  
(-) 
USA 0.420 -1.54 -4.87 -4.53 0.97 1.33 0.97 -0.96 1.14 -1.82 
Brazil 0.225 -1.08 -3.08 -3.30 1.05 0.90 1.16 -1.17 0.84 -1.11 
Argentina 0.144 -0.75 -2.43 -2.28 0.85 0.76 1.11 -1.68 0.57 -1.35 
China 0.083 -1.96 -3.55 -2.88 0.72 0.73 0.92 -0.67 0.95 -0.53 
India 0.040 -1.18 -5.84 -4.52 0.77 0.60 0.69 -1.00 0.14 -1.34 
Paraguay 0.020 -1.09 -6.39 -5.51 1.27 1.12 1.26 -1.34 0.97 -1.40 
Canada 0.016 -1.39 -4.82 -4.33 0.86 0.75 0.93 -0.85 0.59 -1.06 
Indonesia 0.007 -1.45 -4.37 -3.99 1.21 1.09 1.12 -1.45 0.25 -3.22 
Bolivia  0.007 -1.73 -3.07 -3.20 0.92 0.54 1.09 -0.88 0.62 -0.41 
Italy 0.005 -1.93 -7.25 -8.01 1.01 1.05 0.84 -0.97 1.12 -0.60 
Russia 0.003 -2.59 -4.32 -3.96 0.61 0.60 1.01 -0.42 0.78 -0.68 
Ukraine 0.003 -2.32 -5.25 -4.03 0.57 0.69 0.77 -0.18 1.14 0.07 
Uruguay 0.002 -1.31 -2.87 -3.14 1.55 1.24 1.63 -1.95 1.07 -1.66 
Nigeria 0.002 -2.72 -2.64 -2.55 0.64 0.70 1.06 -2.76 1.14 -0.54 
Thailand 0.002 -0.86 -5.17 -3.36 0.88 1.13 0.81 -1.01 0.92 -1.46 
Mexico 0.002 -1.78 -3.67 -2.84 1.06 0.80 0.90 -0.92 0.89 -0.36 
South Africa 0.001 -1.27 -4.11 -3.63 1.15 1.37 0.99 -1.25 1.32 -1.34 
Japan 0.001 -2.05 -2.47 -2.04 -0.29 -0.09 -0.37 -0.06 0.04 0.16 
France 0.001 -1.98 -8.17 -9.97 1.08 1.28 0.92 -0.56 1.29 -0.79 
Vietnam 0.001 -0.92 -1.85 -2.13 0.69 0.34 1.16 -1.12 0.40 -0.45 
S. Korea 0.001 -2.97 -4.58 -3.71 -0.16 -0.16 0.05 0.68 -0.90 -1.02 
Iran  0.001 -1.99 -3.07 -2.83 0.56 -0.45 0.69 -0.73 -0.32 1.14 
Romania 0.001 -1.58 -3.73 -3.29 1.10 0.95 0.98 -0.90 0.45 -1.54 
Ecuador 0.001 -1.77 -2.92 -3.53 -1.23 -0.33 -0.54 4.40 0.78 2.45 
Note: * Critical values for t-ADF, t-EG, t-BDM are 3.24, 3.24, and 3.21, respectively at the 10 % level of 
significance ; White (no shaded)  indicates countries that are cointegrated in both linear and nonlinear tests , dark 
white (shaded) indicates countries that are noncointegrated in both linear and nonlinear tests, and blue (shaded) 
denotes countries who are cointegrated in either tests. 
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Table 3. Cointegration Testing Results and Estimated Transmission Elasticities of Wheat for 
Countries who produce at least 0.5 % of the total global wheat production 
Country Production 
Share 
Unit Root 
Test 
(Producer 
Prices) 
Cointegration  
Tests 
Symmetric Elasticities 
from EG model 
Asymmetric Elasticities  
from NARDL model 
 (1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b) 
  t-ADF 
Stat.* 
Traditional: 
t-EG  
value* 
Asymmetric: 
t-BDM  
value* 
Long-run Short 
-run 
Long 
-run  (+) 
Long 
-run (-) 
Short 
-run (+) 
Short 
-run (-) 
China 0.175 -1.50 -2.56 -3.16 0.67 0.28 1.06 -0.91 0.37 -0.33 
India 0.117 -1.67 -3.90 -2.87 0.41 0.23 0.52 -0.22 0.37 -0.10 
USA 0.099 -1.33 -5.41 -6.30 1.04 1.24 1.07 -1.09 1.05 -1.58 
Russia 0.071 -2.96 -5.33 -4.45 0.71 0.76 1.22 -1.12 0.87 -1.23 
France 0.058 -1.23 -4.16 -2.85 1.12 0.97 0.98 -1.11 0.61 -1.18 
Canada 0.042 -1.91 -3.34 -2.70 0.63 0.66 0.86 -0.33 1.02 -0.26 
Germany 0.034 -0.75 -3.18 -2.62 1.15 1.09 1.00 -1.19 0.84 -1.26 
Turkey 0.032 -2.09 -3.14 -2.55 0.60 0.40 0.88 -0.70 0.50 -0.48 
Australia 0.032 -1.64 -4.62 -3.54 0.82 0.68 0.88 -0.87 0.73 -0.75 
Pakistan 0.032 -1.72 -2.91 -2.35 0.32 -0.21 0.70 -0.35 0.09 0.47 
Ukraine 0.027 -2.16 -6.42 -5.17 0.64 0.65 0.85 -0.54 0.44 -1.08 
UK 0.024 -0.68 -3.41 -2.76 1.08 0.93 1.00 -1.13 0.78 -1.00 
Argentina 0.021 -1.31 -2.56 -2.12 0.78 0.76 0.97 -1.24 0.61 -1.04 
Kazakhstan 0.019 -2.21 -3.90 -3.17 0.92 0.59 1.17 -1.03 0.85 -0.68 
Iran  0.018 -1.62 -3.03 -2.70 0.37 0.42 0.23 0.48 0.63 0.21 
Poland 0.014 -1.18 -4.37 -3.52 0.94 0.98 0.95 -1.02 0.99 -1.03 
Italy 0.013 -1.40 -3.67 -3.13 1.12 1.03 0.99 -1.18 1.08 -0.85 
Egypt 0.011 -1.21 -2.90 -2.63 0.61 0.41 0.90 -0.66 0.47 -0.45 
Romania 0.009 -1.83 -5.01 -4.67 0.60 0.76 0.64 -0.38 0.47 -0.98 
Spain 0.009 -1.20 -3.75 -2.75 1.09 0.89 0.91 -1.07 0.82 -0.83 
Denmark 0.008 -0.78 -3.07 -2.52 1.15 1.07 1.02 -1.20 0.90 -1.16 
Hungary 0.007 -1.28 -5.93 -5.23 0.92 0.97 1.03 -0.83 0.87 -1.18 
Czech  0.007 -1.51 -4.42 -3.15 0.82 0.90 0.92 -0.65 1.02 -0.85 
Morocco 0.006 -1.65 -4.78 -4.17 0.43 0.39 0.40 -0.54 0.30 -0.48 
Brazil 0.006 -1.80 -5.58 -5.53 0.81 0.63 0.90 -0.83 0.60 -0.78 
Mexico 0.006 -1.11 -3.61 -3.12 0.89 0.71 0.94 -1.14 0.49 -1.01 
Note: * Critical values for t-ADF, t-EG, t-BDM are 3.24, 3.24, and 3.21, respectively at the 10 % level of 
significance ; White (no shaded)  indicates countries that are cointegrated in both linear and nonlinear tests , dark 
white (shaded) indicates countries that are noncointegrated in both linear and nonlinear tests, and blue (shaded) 
denotes countries who are cointegrated in either tests. 
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Table 4. Cointegration Testing Results and Estimated Transmission Elasticities of Rice for 
Countries who produce at least 0.4 % of the total global rice production 
country Production 
Share 
Unit Root 
Test 
(Producer 
Prices) 
Cointegration  
Tests 
Symmetric Elasticities 
from EG model 
Asymmetric Elasticities  
from NARDL model 
 (1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b) 
  t-ADF 
Stat.* 
Traditional: 
t-EG  
value* 
Asymmetric: 
t-BDM  
value* 
Long-run Short-run Long-run  
(+) 
Long-run 
 (-) 
Short-run 
 (+) 
Short-run  
(-) 
China 0.308 -2.97 -2.59 -2.41 0.33 0.37 0.77 -0.54 0.04 -1.55 
India 0.215 -1.72 -2.85 -0.89 0.67 0.40 0.44 0.56 0.27 -0.34 
Indonesia 0.089 -0.29 -2.34 -2.09 0.87 0.45 1.07 -0.33 0.12 -1.32 
Bangladesh 0.060 -1.55 -3.02 -2.55 0.31 0.29 0.26 -0.09 0.14 -0.54 
Viet Nam 0.053 -1.54 -3.44 -2.91 0.54 0.50 0.74 -0.19 0.67 -0.23 
Thailand 0.045 -1.60 -4.67 -3.10 0.74 0.92 0.82 -0.71 0.63 -1.83 
Philippines 0.021 -1.46 -2.70 -2.51 0.68 0.42 0.86 -0.96 0.43 -0.57 
Japan 0.019 -1.66 -2.56 -1.84 0.28 0.10 0.28 -0.62 0.05 -0.20 
Brazil 0.018 -1.73 -4.43 -3.52 0.70 0.72 0.75 -0.62 0.52 -1.25 
USA 0.015 -1.91 -4.75 -3.53 0.88 0.92 0.95 -0.89 0.68 -1.67 
Pakistan 0.011 -1.60 -3.89 -4.41 0.41 0.07 0.59 -0.23 -0.11 -0.80 
S. Korea 0.011 -2.33 -3.02 -2.49 -0.10 -0.05 0.01 0.21 -0.08 -0.18 
Egypt 0.009 -1.99 -3.32 -2.96 0.46 0.19 0.74 -0.61 0.07 -0.70 
Cambodia 0.008 -1.64 -3.95 -3.62 0.78 0.82 0.80 -0.73 0.59 -1.61 
Nepal 0.006 -1.88 -3.50 -3.87 0.45 0.07 0.62 -0.20 0.07 -0.14 
Nigeria 0.006 -2.62 -3.93 -4.66 0.68 1.18 0.37 -1.49 0.16 -3.82 
Madagascar 0.005 -2.96 -4.26 -2.68 0.39 0.12 0.53 -0.42 0.18 -0.27 
Sri Lanka 0.005 -1.51 -3.00 -4.32 0.60 0.45 0.62 -0.63 0.84 0.54 
Iran 0.004 -2.00 -3.47 -3.22 0.83 0.30 0.74 -1.08 0.56 1.16 
Malaysia 0.004 -2.44 -3.07 -2.73 0.24 0.20 0.29 -0.12 0.17 -0.36 
Laos 0.004 -1.11 -4.18 -3.46 1.03 0.48 1.09 -1.36 0.35 -0.98 
Note: * Critical values for t-ADF, t-EG, t-BDM are 3.24, 3.24, and 3.21, respectively at the 10 % level of 
significance; White (no shaded)  indicates countries that are cointegrated in both linear and nonlinear tests , dark 
white (shaded) indicates countries that are noncointegrated in both linear and nonlinear tests, and blue (shaded) 
denotes countries who are cointegrated in either tests. 
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Table 5. Unit Root Test (ADF) Results: International Prices 
 H0: No Unit Root 
Variables/Series               Level-p value Difference-p value 
Corn 0.715 0.002 
Soybeans 0.615 0.000 
Wheat 0.452 0.005 
Rice 0.756 0.100 
                            Note: ADF test includes one year lag and a linear time trend 
 
 
Table 6.  Classification of Countries Based on the Existence of Nonlinear Cointegration 
Relationship 
Crop Categories Countries 
Corn 
(104) 
No Long 
Run 
(66) 
China, Mexico, France, India, Italy, Nigeria, Egypt, Spain, Germany, Ethiopia, Russia, Turkey, 
Kenya,  VietNam, Pakistan, Greece, Austria, Venezuela, Nepal, Colombia, Iran,  Chile, 
Cameroon, Slovakia, Portugal, Ecuador, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, CÃ´te d'Ivoire, Mali, Honduras, 
Czech Republic Guinea Australia Kazakhstan Bangladesh Cambodia Madagascar Albania 
Uruguay Switzerland New Zealand Morocco Netherlands Senegal Azerbaijan Panama 
Tajikistan Republic of Korea Bhutan Sri Lanka Yemen Malaysia Namibia Belize Gambia Costa 
Rica Jordan Eritrea Botswana Cabo Verde Congo Lebanon Jamaica Mauritius Puerto Rico 
Long Run 
(38) 
USA Brazil Argentina Indonesia South Africa Romania Canada Ukraine Hungary Philippines 
Thailand Tanzania Croatia Paraguay Poland Ghana R. Moldova Peru Mozambique El 
Salvador Togo Nicaragua Georgia Laos Slovenia Belarus Rwanda Burundi F.Y. Macedonia 
Israel Sudan (former) Dominica Republic Niger Trinidad and Tobago Qatar Fiji Algeria 
Suriname 
Soybeans 
(54) 
No Long 
Run (27) 
Moldova Albania Argentina Austria Bhutan Bolivia Burkina Faso China Ethiopia Georgia Iran 
Japan Laos Mexico Morocco Nepal Nicaragua Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Rwanda 
Slovenia Sri Lanka Uruguay Venezuela Viet Nam 
Long Run 
(27) 
Australia Belize Brazil Cambodia Canada Colombia Croatia Ecuador Egypt France Hungary 
India Indonesia Italy Kazakhstan Paraguay R. Korea Romania Russia Slovakia South Africa 
Spain Suriname Thailand Turkey Ukraine USA 
Wheat 
(82) 
No Long 
Run (47) 
Albania Algeria Argentina Austria Bangladesh Bolivia Burundi Canada Chile China Czech 
Denmark Egypt Eritrea Ethiopia Finland France Georgia Germany India Iran  Italy Japan 
Kazakhstan Kenya Lebanon Lithuania Madagascar Mexico Mongolia Namibia Nepal 
Netherlands Niger Nigeria Pakistan Rwanda Saudi Arabia Slovenia South Africa Spain 
Switzerland Tajikistan Tunisia Turkey UK Yemen 
Long Run 
(35) 
Australia Azerbaijan Belarus Bhutan Brazil Colombia Croatia Cyprus Ecuador Estonia Greece 
Hungary Ireland Israel Jordan Latvia Macedonia Malta Moldova Morocco New Zealand 
Norway Paraguay Peru Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russia Slovakia Sudan (former) 
Sweden Ukraine Uruguay USA 
Rice 
(77) 
No Long 
Run (49) 
Burundi Argentina Thailand Portugal Mali Rwanda Egypt Bhutan Viet Nam Suriname 
Venezuela Niger Malaysia Colombia Madagascar Cameroon Trinidad and Tobago Bangladesh 
Hungary Philippines R. Korea Spain Chile China Australia Brunei Darussalam Guinea Greece 
Tajikistan Indonesia Ghana Senegal Turkey Bolivia Togo Japan Kenya Burkina Faso Ecuador 
Ethiopia France Gambia Dominican Republic Panama Morocco Congo India Mozambique 
Jamaica 
Long Run 
(28) 
Sudan (former) Algeria Costa Rica Honduras Macedonia Romania El Salvador Peru Nigeria 
Russia Pakistan Sri Lanka Belize Nepal Azerbaijan Nicaragua Mexico Cambodia Paraguay 
Kazakhstan CÃ´te d'Ivoire USA Brazil Laos Uruguay Italy Iran  Ukraine 
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Table 7. Crop-Specific Global Mean Estimates of the Transmission Elasticities using Two-step 
System GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Domestic Corn 
price 
Domestic Soybeans 
price 
Domestic Wheat 
price 
Domestic Rice 
price 
Lag Domestic price 0.512** 0.544** 0.633** 0.644** 
 (0.086) (0.108) (0.069) (0.052) 
International  Price 0.358** 0.524** 0.450** 0.410** 
 (0.063) (0.094) (0.073) (0.087) 
Lag International Price -0.044 -0.115 -0.145 -0.225** 
 (0.070) (0.111) (0.092) (0.067) 
Constant 1.049* 0.327 0.363 0.914+ 
 (0.435) (0.439) (0.350) (0.484) 
N 2226 1159 1748 1670 
Instrument count 53 33 33 33 
Panel group 103 54 82 77 
Chi2 (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.078 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.003 0.655 0.001 0.006 
Group min obs. 19 15 9 18 
Group max obs. 22 22 22 22 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Coefficients of all Columns (1) - (4) are estimated 
utilizing two-step system-GMM estimator, where both lagged domestic prices and international prices area treated as 
endogenous.  Standard error is corrected using Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction. All the instrument matrices are 
“collapsed”. The Sargan and Hansen test report the p-values for the goodness of the instrument set. Prices are in log values.  
  
Table 8. Global Mean (all four crops) Estimates of the Transmission Elasticities using GMM 
Estimators 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Domestic 
Price 
Domestic 
Price 
Domestic 
Price 
Domestic 
Price 
Domestic 
Price 
Domestic 
Price 
Lag Domestic Price 0.605** 0.603** 0.854** 0.345** 0.601** 0.621** 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.046) (0.069) (0.045) (0.050) 
International  Price 0.458** 0.460** 0.434** 0.480** 0.336** 0.322** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.034) (0.037) (0.050) (0.051) 
Lag International Price -0.155** -0.157** -0.323** -0.022 -0.128* -0.131* 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.039) (0.055) (0.054) (0.056) 
Constant 0.544* 0.557* 0.181 1.142** 1.094**  
 (0.259) (0.266) (0.167) (0.267) (0.307)  
N 6801 6801 6801 6801 6801 6484 
Instrument count 53 57 97 52 62 59 
Panel group 315 315 315 315 315 315 
Chi2 (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Group min obs. 18 18 18 504 18 16 
Group max obs. 22 22 22 504 22 21 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Coefficients of all Columns (1) - (5) are estimated 
utilizing two-step system-GMM estimator. Column (6) is estimated utilizing two-step diff-GMM estimator. In both cases, the 
lagged domestic prices and international price area treated as endogenous.  Standard error is corrected using Windmeijer (2005) 
finite sample correction. All the instrument matrices are “collapsed”. The Sargan and Hansen test report the p-values for the 
goodness of the instrument set. Prices are in log values. 
